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SAFE AT HOME? ASSESSING U.S. EFFORTS 
TO PROTECT YOUTHS FROM THE EFFECTS 
OF PERFORMANCE ENHANCING DRUGS IN 
SPORTS 
INTRODUCTION 
y the summer of 1998, baseball had finally risen from the ashes of 
the 1994 players strike that had resulted in a shortened season and 
the first ever cancellation of the World Series.1 It was 1998 when a  
nation of baseball fans was once again captivated, particularly by the 
epic competition unfolding between Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa, 
both of whom were in hot pursuit of Roger Maris’ thirty-seven-year  
single-season home run record.2 That year also marked the beginning of 
a stretch of three straight World Series championships for baseball’s 
winningest and most popular franchise, the New York Yankees.3 And 
then, in 2001, Barry Bonds had the nation’s spotlight as he obliterated 
McGwire’s homerun record,4 and the Yankees came within one inning of 
a fourth-straight championship,5 their epic playoff run helping New York 
and the rest of the country recover from the tragic events of September 
11 only two months earlier.6 Three years later, Roger Clemens won an 
unprecedented seventh Cy Young award, becoming the oldest player to 
ever receive the prestigious honor.7 Baseball was once again America’s 
pastime. 
The next year, however, saw baseball’s ultimate fall from grace. In 
2005, many of the game’s greatest players, including both McGwire and 
Sosa, were subpoenaed by the United States Congressional House Gov-
ernment Reform Committee to respond to allegations of widespread use 
of performance enhancing drugs (“PEDs”) throughout the game.8 An 
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internal investigation commissioned by Major League Baseball, which 
released its findings in 2007, named ten members of the 2000 World 
Championship team as PED users.9 Bonds has since been indicted on 
perjury charges following his potentially dishonest testimony regarding 
his use of steroids,10 and similar charges may soon be levied against 
Clemens in the wake of his heavily publicized confrontation with his 
former trainer before Congress.11 Suffice to say, a dark shroud has fallen 
over many historic baseball records in the eyes of fans who have become 
skeptical of their heroes’ once remarkable athletic accomplishments.12 
While McGwire and Sosa remain in baseball purgatory,13 Major 
League Baseball has ostracized Clemens and Bonds as it scrambles to 
restore its image and regain the trust of its fan base. Although it boasts a 
new drug testing policy,14 Major League Baseball’s efforts to shuttle in a 
new era of superstars have largely failed. In the past year alone, two of 
the most influential members of this next generation of supposedly 
“clean” superstars have been linked to PEDs; one by admission (Alex 
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Rodriguez),15 and another by failing a league-sponsored drug test (Man-
ny Ramirez).16 This new era of drug testing in professional sports does 
not mean the game has rid itself of its ugly past. It means only that is has 
become harder for players to cheat. Now, the question to be asked is: 
why are professional athletes going to measures as extreme as using 
women’s fertility drugs17 to cover up their continued use of PEDs,  
despite the strict testing regime in place? 
Success in professional sports is often accompanied by notoriety and 
extreme wealth, which only add to the competitive nature of the industry. 
Athletes seek to gain advantages by hiring personal strength coaches, 
engaging in high intensity training programs, and monitoring their diets 
closely.18 The use of chemical substances to augment training and diet 
programs can exaggerate the benefits the athletes derive.19 The principle 
objective in sport has always been victory, but now, in this modern era, 
maximizing individual performance is equally important, and a majority 
of athletes use some form of legal, natural, or artificial means to enhance 
their athletic performance.20 Dietary supplements, for example, may  
improve athletic performance, but they do not create an unfair advantage 
as they are widely available and are not known to induce the growth or 
strengthening of muscle tissue or to cause other biological effects that 
can be directly attributed to athletic success. 
In an attempt to achieve greater on-field performance, however, some 
athletes are willing to use illicit PEDs that their sports’ governing bodies 
have banned. When competing at the highest levels of professional sport, 
there is little difference between competitors in terms of pure skill.21  
Only the smallest percentage of athletes will advance to the professional 
level and succeed by exhibiting superior athletic abilities in comparison 
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to their opponents.22 For this reason, “marginal advantages are likely to 
produce substantial competitive gains.”23 
Even if athletes are being tested for PEDs, the prospect of international 
fame, immense wealth, and the desire to achieve life-long dreams may 
outweigh the deterrence capacity of the anti-doping polices. Even Olym-
pic-caliber athletes will feel the draw of PEDs in order to improve their 
chances at a gold medal. Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson, who was once 
known as “The Fastest Man in the World” (a title given to the world 
record holder in the 100 meter dash)24 and who was named the  
Associated Press Male Athlete of the Year in 1987,25 was stripped of his 
world record and 1988 Olympic gold medal when he tested positive for 
the prohibited substance Stanozolol following the race.26 Doping scan-
dals have also plagued the world renowned Tour de France, as 2006 
winner Floyd Landis was stripped of his title when his urine sample 
tested positive for the presence of a prohibited PED.27 And that same 
year, cycling superstars Jan Ullrich and Ivan Basso were among several 
cyclists barred from competition because they failed drug tests even be-
fore the race began.28 These athletes competed in their respective events, 
well aware of the drug testing mechanisms in place. Still, athletes will 
continue to use PEDs because the prospects for victory and the  
associated personal and economic benefits justify the risk of being 
caught.29 
As professional sports leagues bitterly debate the imposition of new 
drug testing policies that fall outside the scope of the current testing pro-
gram that was approved as part of their active collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”), new PEDs are being developed in laboratories and 
                                                                                                             
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Alex Altman, Brief History: The World’s Fastest Human, TIME, Aug. 31, 2009, at 
14. 
 25. Associated Press, AP Male Athlete of the Year, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 2007, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2007-12-21-2365825514_x.htm. 
 26. Michael Janofsky, The Seoul Olympics: Johnson Loses Gold to Lewis After Drug 
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1988, at A1. 
 27. Juliet Macur, Landis’ Positive Doping Test Upheld, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, 
http://nytimes.com/2007/09/21/sports/sportsspecial1/21landis.html. 
 28. John Leicester, Ullrich, Basso, Barred from Tour de France Amid Doping Scan-
dal; Vinokourov Also Out, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
sports/cycling/tourdefrance/2006-06-30-doping-scandal_x.htm; John Ward Anderson, Dop-
ing Scandal Rocks Cycling; Several Favorites Banned on Eve Of Tour de France, WASH. 
POST, July 1, 2006, at E.1. 
 29. Haagen, supra note 18, at 834. 
2010] SAFE AT HOME? 275 
basements across the nation.30 Some supplements, known as designer 
steroids are being created specifically to avoid detection methods and are 
being labeled as dietary supplements by their developers.31 Designer  
steroids are known steroid compounds that have been chemically altered 
so that they retain the same enhancement effects while becoming  
undetectable by drug testing laboratories.32 Since the creation of designer 
steroids does not require complex chemical knowledge,33 the possibility 
that they will spread throughout professional sports is undeniable. 
In response to the increased international awareness of the use of  
illegal PEDs, and the individual sporting associations’ apparent inability 
to successfully level the playing field, national governments have taken 
notice, and, in some cases, have instituted comprehensive national drug 
testing legislation for professional sports.34 Italy, for example, has 
adopted legislation to criminalize the use of PEDs in athletic competi-
tion, employing heavy fines or the threat of imprisonment to combat dop-
ing in sports.35 The United States, on the other hand, has implicitly held 
that doping in professional sports is a matter to be regulated privately 
between the leagues and the players’ associations through their CBAs.36 
For instance, nearly ten proposed bills37 intended to regulate drug testing 
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in professional sports, a paramount concern of then President George W. 
Bush,38 have died on the floor of Congress without sufficient support.39 
Doping scandals continue to plague professional sports in the United 
States because the punishments for a positive test remain relatively  
minimal.40 Without severe threats of heavy fines, potential expulsion 
from the sport, or even criminal penalties for positive tests, professional 
athletes will not be sufficiently deterred from using PEDs. This Note will 
examine foreign anti-doping legislation in order to ascertain whether 
similar legislation would be viable in the United States. It will then  
examine whether or not the implementation of such laws would serve as 
a successful deterrent against the use of PEDs in professional sports. Part 
I provides background on the mounting issue of doping in sports and  
explains the rationale for an anti-doping regulation scheme. Part II sur-
veys foreign and international anti-doping legislation and evaluates the 
legitimacy of criminal sanctions against professional athletes and  
associated individuals who violate the national anti-doping legislative 
scheme. Part III assesses the current stance toward anti-doping legisla-
tion in the United States and considers the viability of adopting elements 
of foreign national anti-doping regulation. Part IV contemplates the  
effects of a de-regulated playing field and urges Congressional consider-
ation of criminal sanctions in the United States. Ultimately, this Note 
calls for the United States to adopt criminal anti-doping legislation  
informed by other international regimes in order to combat the use of 
performance enhancing drugs by professional athletes, lest the U.S. risk 
being defeated by unscrupulous steroid manufacturers, distributors, and 
the professional athletes who exploit undetectable biological perfor-
mance enhancement substances that degrade the concept of pure athletic 
competition. 
I. HOME-FIELD DISADVANTAGE 
A. Background 
In 1987, the National Football League (“NFL”) became the first pro-
fessional sports league in the United States to begin testing for illegal 
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PEDs.41 The NFL has by far the most stringent PED testing policy of any 
major sports league in the United States.42 Aside from testing its players 
more often than any other major professional sports league43 (and  
without notice to the athlete),44 the NFL testing program distinguishes 
itself from other programs with its application beyond athletes. Under the 
league policy, “[C]oaches, trainers and other personnel are restricted 
from condoning, supplying, or encouraging the use of steroids” and may 
be sanctioned by the commissioner.45 
The National Basketball Association (“NBA”) first began testing for  
illegal drugs in 1999,46 but the focus of the program was geared mostly 
toward treatment of drug abuse.47 Furthermore, even though the testing 
program covered PEDs, the sanctions for illegal drug use were hardly 
punitive.48 Under the 1999 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, a 
player who voluntarily turned himself in to league officials for any drug 
use, including PEDs would be given counseling and treatment but would 
not be penalized for his doping offenses.49 
It was not until 2002 that Major League Baseball (“MLB”) and the 
Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) finally agreed 
to implement a mandatory drug-testing program.50 It is widely believed 
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that the league had never previously implemented a testing program  
because league officials and team owners were aware of the rampant 
drug use, tacitly condoning the activity.51 This was because they believed 
that the increased number of homeruns hit by “juiced up” players would 
provide an economic windfall to both the teams and the league by bring-
ing more fans to the ballpark.52 Not surprisingly, as the number of sus-
pected players using PEDs grew during the 1990s, so did the pockets of 
MLB executives, team owners, and athletes.53 
In the year following McGwire and Sosa’s epic homerun chase, Major 
League Baseball went as far as to lecture team executives on the benefits 
of testosterone, eschewing the notion that unnatural hormones could have 
negative health consequences.54 By the turn of the decade, baseball had 
adopted a steroid culture where teams would hire strength coaches with 
no baseball experience55 who would not only put players on training  
regimes, but also recommend the best combination of “ergogenic aids”56 
and how to cycle them in order to maximize performance without deplet-
ing the body of its natural hormones.57 
Former Major League MVP Jose Canseco estimated in 2003 that  
approximately 85% of players were using some form of illegal PEDs.58 
Another former MVP and admitted user, Ken Caminiti,59 believed half of 
all baseball players were using steroids.60 Canseco’s manager with the 
Oakland Athletics, Tony La Russa, gave an interview with 60 Minutes61 
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and explained how Canseco openly discussed his steroid use with no ap-
parent fear of discipline.62 La Russa never reported Canseco’s likely 
abuse to MLB63 and later stated that Major League Baseball could have 
been “more hard-nosed about their approach” in combating PEDs. 64 
Even so, “any effort would likely have been rebuffed by the [MLB] 
Players Association” (“MLBPA”).65 The “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t 
care”66 attitude of the MLB was manifested by athletes exchanging 
signed memorabilia for sacks of “greenies” directly in front of fans on 
the field before games,67 and players openly discussing their steroid pro-
grams in the clubhouse.68 Managers and front office executives claimed 
ignorance under the auspices of “wanting to respect their players’ priva-
cy.”69 By 2001, “[I]f you weren’t cheating, you weren’t trying.”70 
Until 2002, the MLBPA refused to engage in any discussions of a  
steroid testing policy,71 arguing it constituted an invasion of privacy and 
an “abuse of human rights.”72 Eventually, the MLB and the Player’s  
Association agreed to initial survey testing, in which each player would 
be tested twice during the 2003 season, though there would be no  
punishment for a positive test.73 By spring training that year, players had  
become so addicted and accustomed to the uncontested use of PEDs and 
the resulting muscle enhancement and exponential growth in player sala-
ries that they could not stop using even when they knew the tests were 
coming.74 
As per the agreement, since more than five percent of the entire league 
tested positive for some form of PED, mandatory testing was imple-
mented for the 2004 season.75 The penalties for a positive test, however, 
were inadequate, as the punishment merely subjected the athlete to fur-
                                                                                                             
 62. Fortenberry & Hoffman, supra note 42, at 139. 
 63. MLB Responds, supra note 61. 
 64. Rebecca Leung, MLB Swings Back at Steroid Claims, CBSNEWS.COM, Feb. 16, 
2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/15/60II/main674297.shmtl?tag=contentMain; 
contentBody. 
 65. Id. 
 66. TORRE & VERDUCCI, supra note 5, at 88. 
 67. Id. at 109. 
 68. Id. at 103. 
 69. Id. at 108. 
 70. Id. at 103. 
 71. Showalter, supra note 39, at 658; Barry M. Bloom, Mandatory Steroid Testing to 
Begin, MLB.COM, Nov. 13, 2003, http://www.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20031113& 
content_id=603458&vkey=news_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb. 
 72. Showalter, supra note 39, at 658. 
 73. Id. 
 74. TORRE & VERDUCCI, supra note 5, at 116. 
 75. Id. 
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ther testing and treatment programs, with no suspensions or fines for a 
violation.76 The drug policy was again amended in 2005,77 but the penal-
ty for a first time offense was only a ten-day suspension78—not even ten 
games. Even though the league only tested for forty-five banned sub-
stances, twelve players received the ten-day suspension in the first year 
under the amended 2005 drug testing agreement.79 
This de facto “look-the-other-way” steroid policy has drawn “fierce 
Congressional and media scrutiny” for the inability of the Commission-
er’s Office and MLBPA to reach an adequate drug policy.80 Former 
World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”) chairman Richard Pound called 
the 2003 MLB drug testing program “a complete and utter joke”81 and 
“an insult to the fight against doping in sport, an insult to the intelligence 
of the American public, and an insult to the game itself.”82 Pound could 
not believe that the MLB would require an athlete to knowingly cheat 
five times before facing only a one-year suspension.83 Currently the MLB 
has a new drug-testing regime in place,84 but even with national media 
and political attention focused specifically on the MLB, the league con-
tinues to boast the most lenient drug testing policy of all major profes-
sional sports.85 
The PED problem, however, does not lie squarely within the profes-
sional sports leagues. As more superstars are admitting to PED use or 
being caught red handed, public perception is rapidly shifting from  
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outrage to apathy.86 Fans recently welcomed back Manny Ramirez from 
his 50-game suspension with celebratory open arms and a standing  
ovation.87 Fans were too quick to forgive Ramirez, considering he never 
fully admitted wrongdoing or even sought forgiveness. Explaining to 
eight-year-old little leaguers88 that cheaters can still be idolized sports 
heroes has become nothing more than an unfortunate side effect of enter-
taining Americans with the allure of 500-foot homeruns.89 
Controlling the use of PEDs is by no means an issue limited to the 
United States. Performance enhancement in sports has been around since 
the ancient Olympic games in Greece when no rules governed the per-
formance of participants.90 For centuries, triumphant athletes have been 
able to reap the rewards and riches that accompany athletic success,  
ingesting any substance that could potentially enhance performance 
without risk of punishment. 91 The first major international organization 
to ban doping in sports was the International Association of Athletics 
Federations in 1966,92 with the International Olympic Committee 
(“IOC”) following suit the next year.93 
Currently, PED use by Olympic Athletes is regulated by WADA, 
which has established a comprehensive list of prohibited substances.94 
The list is amended constantly because WADA employs first-class scien-
tists to develop new PEDs, which enables additional tests to be devel-
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oped in an attempt to keep pace with and identify new designer stero-
ids.95 WADA has also created universal sanctions for athletes who test 
positive as part of the comprehensive World Anti-Doping Code.96 
B. Rationale 
Having spent the majority of his efforts as IOC President working to 
combat doping in sport, Jacques Rogge has stated that PEDs are the 
foremost danger to fair competition and the health of Olympians.97 For-
mer WADA Chairman Richard Pound summarily stated that the credibil-
ity of sports would be lost until PED users are banished.98 He said, “Dop-
ing is the single most important problem facing sport today. If we don’t 
win the fight, Olympic-standard sport will not survive—because the pub-
lic will have no respect for it. Cheats make what should be a triumph of 
human achievement into a hollow pretence.”99 
Athletes who use PEDs not only subject themselves to well-
documented health risks100 and potentially life threatening conse-
quences,101 but also peripherally implicate other professional athletes by 
forcing them to use PEDs to remain competitive, as well as high school 
and college students who admire such athletes as role models.102 In fact, 
after it was first reported that Mark McGwire used the substance andros-
tenedione103 during the 1998 season, estimated sales of performance-
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enhancing substances increased nearly five-fold.104 Furthermore, a 1990s 
study on steroid use among teenagers concluded that nearly one million 
teenage athletes had used steroids at least once.105 A 2003 survey  
conducted by the United States Center for Disease Control concluded 
that “steroid use by high school students had more than doubled since 
1991, to more than six percent.”106 
As more athletes are using PEDs to improve on field performance,  
other athletes may be similarly inspired to attempt to level the playing 
field. Athletes might use PEDs when they otherwise would not if they 
are led to believe the league cannot successfully keep the game clean.107 
The nature of sport has evolved as athletes who once trained alone or 
with a friend in preparation for a season are now likely to be “surrounded 
by, and to be increasingly dependent upon” an entire staff of medical 
personnel in an effort to “compete more effectively in their chosen 
sport.”108 If medical and support staff can promise athletes improved  
levels of performance through the use of PEDs, it may be hard for an 
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athlete to turn PEDs down with the possibility of lagging behind cheaters 
in their sport.109 
Additionally, such prospects of excessive financial reward and interna-
tional recognition have placed a major emphasis on individual perfor-
mance. United States Olympic Coach Brooks Johnson explained that the 
increasing reward from sporting success has driven “top-class interna-
tional athletes to ‘wake up with the desire and the need and the compul-
sion and the obsession to win, and they go to sleep with it.’”110 The most 
lucrative rewards for success at the highest levels of competition are only 
available to a tiny sub-class of professional athletes.111 Robert Voy,  
former Chief Medical Officer for the United States Olympic Committee, 
stated poignantly that, in terms of money, “[S]econd place doesn’t 
count.”112 
The steroid epidemic is hardly limited to our nation’s top performers. 
As mentioned above, even bench warmers and career minor leaguers are 
using PEDs and putting their livelihoods in jeopardy for a shot at athletic 
and financial success that may never come to fruition.113 For some pro-
fessional and amateur athletes, a dedication to strength training and close 
dietary monitoring will not be enough to elevate them to the top of their 
profession.114 PEDs have the potential of allowing fringe players to  
extend their careers by years and remain relevant in their profession long 
enough to carve out a decent financial nest egg.115 Positive tests for PED 
use are significantly more prevalent in baseball’s Minor Leagues,116 
where recent high school graduates and college-age athletes are attempt-
ing to live out their dream of playing in the big leagues and signing mega 
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endorsement deals. How are we to teach our nation’s youth that sports 
are about more than just winning and losing, when their heroes, and even 
those athletes who never make it to the big leagues, appear repulsively 
focused on personal statistics and victory alone? 
The United States Office of National Drug Control Policy (“ONDCP”) 
has identified doping in sports as an “international crisis” and has de-
clared that it has reached a level where clean athletes will be indefinitely 
outscored, outrun, outrivaled, and overwhelmed by PED users.117 Still, 
even though the United States Olympic Committee has adopted the 
WADA code for regulation of international athletic competition,118 no 
action has been taken to address similar problems that plague its more 
prominent national sporting associations. 
Many governments and regulatory agencies acknowledge that athletic 
competition is an essential element of national culture119 and that regula-
tion of PED use is justified by the need to preserve its spirit.120 The 
WADA Code (“the Code”) defines the “spirit of sport” as the “intrinsic 
value [of sport and] the essence of Olympism . . . [it is] the celebration of 
the human spirit, body, and mind, characterized by values such as ethics 
and fair play, respect for rule and laws, teamwork, dedication, and com-
mitment.”121 
During international competition, athletes represent their countries; 
therefore, a positive test of a victorious athlete will have ramifications 
beyond the shamed athlete. Not only will the athlete be stripped of his or 
her medal, humiliating the athlete’s home nation, but the positive test 
will also suggest that the athlete’s home country was unable to properly 
regulate PEDs within its borders.122 Furthermore, Olympic host nations 
often play a large role in the organization and facilitation of WADA anti-
doping regulation, so in an effort to avoid the scandal that has plagued so 
many previous Olympiads, it is highly important that the host nation 
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sponsors a drug-free Olympic games.123 One must begin to question 
whether recent U.S. bids to host the Olympics—bids that have ultimately 
failed despite having advanced to the final rounds of consideration—
have been stymied by the growing notion that PED use in America can-
not be controlled. 
Success and recognition are pinnacles of achievement in the medical 
science profession just as they are in sports.124 Major breakthroughs, 
however, such as the development of a chemical compound capable of 
producing growth of muscle tissue125 in the human body, may provide a 
significant economic windfall to the developer,126 but it will not be likely 
to attract the same commercial endorsement deals or the notoriety and 
international celebrity given to Olympic World Record Holders127 or 
Home Run Champions.128 When tempted by the vast sums of money and 
wide recognition among professional athletes, it would not be surprising 
to see some medical entrepreneurs willing to pair with athletes for a sub-
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stantial sum and provide them with the tools they desire to achieve great-
ness in their respective sports. 
Why, then, should performance-enhancing drugs be banned? Anabolic 
steroids have well documented medical benefits, and are currently used 
for therapeutic reasons such as inducing puberty in men129 and treating 
chronic medical conditions like HIV.130 Athletes, however, may be 
drawn to PEDs for non-therapeutic purposes because they may improve 
physical condition by inducing the growth of muscle mass by increasing 
protein and reducing fat.131 
There is a constituency of both athletes and medical professionals who 
advocate the deregulation of PEDs and would seek to allow athletes to 
use steroids in sports.132 Former world champion skier Bode Miller has 
publically voiced his desire to allow athletes to use PEDs under medical 
supervision after receiving full disclosure of known health risks.133  
Athletes already achieve success through intense training regimens and 
strict adherence to diet and nutrient intake.134 If professional sports are 
truly the highest level of athletic performance, why not allow the  
individual athletes to further enhance their abilities through synthetic 
supplements? 
We cannot condone the legal use of PEDs because their legitimization 
among professional athletes invites young athletes to use them with im-
punity, meanwhile society has acknowledged the potentially severe med-
ical risks their use entails.135 A popular sentiment among commentators 
is that “[c]oncern for youth health and moral questions regarding the use 
of enhancement by youths in sports is without a doubt the driving force 
in this issue.”136 
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For many young athletes, PEDs may be a “gateway to achieving athlet-
ic dreams.”137 For children, athletes are heroes and role models, and the 
media magnifies their every move: 
To impressionable young athletes, [PED use by Olympic and profes-
sional athletes] can create the impression of implied legitimacy. Re-
ports of . . . steroid users do not necessarily translate into images of 
cheaters or lawbreakers in the eyes of a young athlete. It is more likely 
that they see . . . celebrit[ies] . . . in great physical condition, perform[ing] 
at the top of their game, and mak[ing] a great deal of money.138 
As noted by Dr. Denise Garibaldi, who lost her own son after he com-
mitted suicide following a bout of steroid-induced depression, desires to 
make the high school sports team, attempts to earn an athletic scholarship 
in college, or aspirations to get noticed by professional scouts are com-
mon reasons to use PEDs.139 Young athletes only see the successes of 
their heroes on national television and on Wheaties boxes; they do not 
read about the conclusions of preliminary laboratory tests on the long-
term side effects of PEDs. 
II. POLICING THE INTERNATIONAL PLAYING FIELDS 
A. International Agreements 
Conceptually, the legal system functions to impede immoral and dan-
gerous behavior while at the same time attempting to promote desirable 
social norms.140 Once the documented use of PEDs became more preva-
lent in the mid 1980s, the international community determined that the 
existing drug testing regimes were not solving the problems. As nations 
gathered to brainstorm ways to address this emerging global concern, 
their focus was not on punishment of athletes using PEDs, but rather on 
educating the world regarding the health risks and moral consequences of 
PED use.141 In 1989, the Council of Europe addressed the issue by creat-
ing, and eventually ratifying, the Anti-Doping Convention (the “Conven-
tion”).142 The Convention143 set forth a number of technical, legislative, 
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financial, and educational standards and regulations grounded upon the 
consensus that anti-doping laws were necessary to preserve individual 
health and to maintain the integrity of sports.144 The Convention calls for 
the protection of current athletes’ health145 and education for the interna-
tional youth as to the potential medical consequences associated with 
PEDs.146 
The IOC’s goals of informing young athletes of the medical dangers 
and ethical implications of PED use is essential for combating PEDs.147 
Article Six of the Convention calls for the implementation of programs 
targeted at school students and young athletes, dedicated to the education 
and dissemination of information regarding the health risks inherent in 
doping.148 Without these educational programs, there will be little to 
temper the desire of youths to follow in the footsteps of athletes who 
have publicly admitted to using steroids149 or those who are alleged to 
have done so during their professional careers150 but who have not faced 
sanctions from their respective leagues. 
The Convention was a good first step toward recognizing the global 
problem of PEDs in sports, but the document fails to address many  
important issues necessary for a comprehensive anti-doping regime. The 
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Convention makes a noble effort to adopt “appropriate legislation, regu-
lations or administrative measures to restrict the availability . . . as well 
as the use in sport of banned doping agents, and doping methods and in 
particular anabolic steroids.”151 Yet, the Convention lacks the compliance 
and enforcement power—issues commonly associated with international 
soft law documents.152 The Convention also calls for member nations to 
assist sports organizations in financing doping controls through subsidies 
and grants,153 but it fails to identify a source for consistent income. 
Similarly, the Convention implores parties to “encourage and . . .  
facilitate” the implementation of anti-doping controls by sports organiza-
tions154 and to assist these organizations and their members in negotiating 
a satisfactory testing regime that can operate uniformly on the interna-
tional level.155 However, without required action or benchmarks for  
implementation, any specific action pursuant to the Convention is left to 
the individual member states. The Convention recommends that coun-
tries create a harmonized list of banned substances,156 drug testing proce-
dures,157 and disciplinary procedures that apply “agreed international 
principles of natural justice . . . and ensur[e] respect for the fundamental 
rights of suspected sportsmen and sportswomen.”158 The Convention fur-
ther encourages parties to work with their sports organizations in order to 
sanction medical personnel who may be responsible for disseminating 
PEDs to professional athletes.159 But such efforts may become difficult 
when nation states must not only seek to unify an anti-doping regime 
within their borders without clear international guidance, but also then 
attempt to bring these laws in line with their international counterparts. 
For nearly a decade, the international sports community struggled to 
adhere to the lofty goals set forth in the Convention, and sought to create 
a new international scheme, particularly with regard to implementing 
doping controls160 and sanctions for PED use.161 In 1999, WADA 
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emerged as a byproduct of an international movement to eradicate dop-
ing in sports and to “promote, coordinate, and monitor the fight against 
doping in sports in all its forms.”162 In particular, WADA was developed 
in response to the lack of uniform testing procedures and regulation of 
anti-doping in international sports.163 
To combat the disjointed nature of the fight against PEDs, the creation 
of WADA was a major step in the fight against doping in sports because 
the agency was founded on the notion that a comprehensive anti-doping 
program should provide athletes and sports federations with the same 
anti-doping procedures “no matter the nationality, the sport[,] or the 
country where tested.”164 Unlike the Convention, WADA has generated a 
comprehensive four-part scheme to anti-doping regulation that includes: 
mandatory implementation of specific doping controls with uniform test-
ing procedures and sanctions for violations;165 education and research 
programs;166 well-defined roles and responsibilities for athletes and med-
ical and support personnel;167 and specific guidance with respect to com-
pliance and interpretation of the WADA Code (the “Code”).168 
Much like the Convention, one of the primary goals of WADA was the 
promotion of “health, fairness[,] and equality for athletes worldwide.”169 
The goal was not only to protect the health of athletes, but also to restore 
the integrity of athletic competition and preserve the values of fair play, 
ethics, and honesty.170 The purpose of WADA, however, was to move 
beyond the Convention to ensure effective and uniform enforcement at 
the international level.171 WADA succeeds by incorporating a list of 
banned substances and providing specific guidance for laboratory  
accreditation and testing procedures that are binding on the more than 
five-hundred sports organizations that have adopted the Code.172 
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WADA takes a hard-line stance towards the presence of prohibited 
substances in an athletes’ body.173 Under a strict liability regime, athletes 
are under a duty of personal responsibility and any specimen that shows 
the presence of a prohibited substance, or its metabolites or markers, will 
be considered an anti-doping violation without any consideration of  
intent, fault, negligence, or knowing use.174 Therefore, an athlete is guilty 
of an anti-doping violation as soon as an illegal substance is discov-
ered.175 Furthermore, athletes who refuse to participate in the anti-doping 
scheme or those who “fail without compelling justification to submit to a 
drug test are guilty of an anti-doping violation under WADA.”176 
Although the standard for an anti-doping violation does not rise to the 
level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the current regime is necessary 
to close off potential loopholes in the system. As seen from the BALCO 
scandal in 2003, in which many prominent American athletes were 
linked to a drug laboratory known to produce THG,177 athletes testing 
positive for PEDs might claim they did not know a particular substance 
was prohibited, or that they were simply given a supplement by a trainer 
or medical personnel without knowledge of its illicit nature.178 Even 
though many athletes involved in the BALCO scandal have claimed ig-
                                                                                                             
 173. THE CODE, supra note 83, at 8. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Wendt, supra note 97, at 9. 
 176. Id. At the Athens 2004 Olympic Games, Hungary’s Adrian Annus was stripped of 
his gold medal in the hammer throw when he failed to submit to a follow-up drug test 
required by the IOC. Id. Although Annus had already been tested twice—once before the 
event and once afterwards, both with negative results—later analysis suggested possible 
foul play as samples appeared to have come from two different athletes. Id. After initially 
refusing, “Annus finally returned the medal after IOC threatened to suspend Hungary’s 
Olympic membership and withdraw its financial support.” Id. Similarly, Greek sprinters 
Kostas Kenteris and Katerina Thanou missed a doping test before the Olympics that year, 
and each received a two-year suspension for violating the anti-doping code. Kenteris was 
rumored to be chosen to light the Olympic flame to open the Syndey games, but instead 
withdrew from the Games. Id. at 10. 
 177. See supra note 125 and accompanying test. 
 178. Wendt, supra note 97, at 10; Sal Ruibal, BALCO Becoming Household Name, 
USATODAY.COM, Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2004-12-03-balco-over 
view-1c_x.htm; see also USA Shooting & Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir, 1 Recueil 
des sentences due TAS [Digest of CAS Awards] 187, 193–94 (Court of Arbitration in 
Sport establishing a strict liability standard for a positive test for PEDs). Without strict 
liability, the rule could be undermined by coaches and trainers who provide athletes with 
the substance. Additionally, a competitive advantage need not be gained in order to  
violate the anti-doping code. “To require the relevant sports body to establish mens rea 
would impose . . . a burden which it could not easily discharge, and which could lead to 
protracted, bitter and ultimately, inconclusive hearings.” Michael J. Beloff, Drugs, Laws 
and Versapaks, in DRUGS AND DOPING IN SPORT 44 (John O’Leary ed., 2001). 
2010] SAFE AT HOME? 293 
norance to the ingestion of any banned substance, the results of numer-
ous athletic competitions which have not already been overturned may 
forever remain tainted due to the presence of PEDs in the athlete’s body. 
For this reason, and, additionally, to prevent athletes from attempting 
to cover up “knowing and intentional use” of PEDs by declaring their 
lack of knowledge of the presence of PEDs in their bodies, WADA  
imposes a strict liability standard179 for anti-doping violations.180 WADA 
also imposes sanctions upon medical and training staff to ensure that 
those parties who are responsible for intentionally administering PEDs to 
an athlete without the athlete’s knowledge will be punished under the 
anti-doping code.181 Furthermore, a requirement of intent would impose 
substantial litigation costs that might not only cripple many sports  
federations financially,182 but could also delay the official results of 
championship competitions significantly. Although many believe the 
reduced standard of proof under the WADA scheme is unfair to the ath-
letes,183 athletes are put on notice of the stringent WADA policies behind 
the testing regime when they agree to participate in the sporting event. 
This lesser quantum of proof forces athletes to make informed choices 
about what substances they put into their bodies with the goal of  
ultimately reducing the serious health risks PED users impose upon 
themselves. Athletes who are willing to chance these health risks do so 
knowing they are also risking their athletic careers. 
WADA’s comprehensive doping control scheme is ineffective without 
a method of ensuring compliance by the international sports federations. 
The Code is a nongovernmental document, thus, many governments are 
unable to enforce its provisions effectively—the threat of governmental 
sanctions would make it much easier to engender athletes’ compliance 
with the testing procedures.184 The international community reconvened 
to address the issue of noncompliance and lack of enforcement at the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
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(“UNESCO”) General Conference in October 2003.185 Thirty-eight  
nations “unanimously adopted and ratified the UNESCO Convention 
(also known as the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport) on 
October 19, 2005.”186 The agreement was reached upon the premise that 
“sport should play an important role in the protection of health, in moral 
and physical education, and in the promotion of international understand-
ing and peace. . . .”187 
The Copenhagen Declaration creates a legal framework for the imple-
mentation of the WADA Code, creating the first binding piece of anti-
doping legislation.188 The Declaration required ratification by thirty 
countries in order for it to become effective189 which did not occur until 
December 2006, finally bringing the Convention into effect on February 
1, 2007.190 
The Copenhagen declaration calls for nation-states to “provide funding 
[for WADA] within their respective budgets”191 and requires national 
legislatures to implement laws to control availability of banned sub-
stances192 and to begin to create domestic frameworks for implementing 
the WADA code in their respective nations.193 The United States, how-
ever, has not ratified the Copenhagen Declaration, and has taken no  
affirmative legislative action in the fight against illegal PEDs.194 
Even though WADA and the accompanying Copenhagen Declaration 
provide for comprehensive doping control systems and the means for 
nations to implement the policies, there is insufficient evidence that the 
policies in place are effective at stopping the abuse of PEDs. 
B. National Regimes 
1. Rationale 
The international agreements only establish a baseline of anti-doping 
regulations, as participating countries are free to enact more stringent 
                                                                                                             
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. International Convention Against Doping in Sport, adopted Oct. 19, 2005, avail-
able at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001425/142594m.pdf#page=2 [hereinafter 
Copenhagen Declaration]. 
 188. Rosen, supra note 160, at 5. 
 189. Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 187, at art. 37. 
 190. World Anti-Doping Agency, Governments, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/ (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2008). 
 191. Copenhagen Declaration, supra note 187, at art. 11. 
 192. Id. at art. 8. 
 193. Id. at art. 7. 
 194. Rosen, supra note 160, at 5; see discussion infra Part III. 
2010] SAFE AT HOME? 295 
restrictions that address special concerns of the nation not raised or left 
unresolved by the International agreements. Many governments have 
found the Code very difficult to understand and thus even harder to  
implement into their nations’ legal frameworks.195 For example, the stan-
dard sanction to be imposed for a first time offense may be reduced five 
different ways, each requiring the application of a different section of the 
Code.196 Additionally, when the individual sports federation has its own 
sanctioning policy for anti-doping violations, or a banned substances list 
that is different from WADA’s list, it becomes extremely difficult for 
athletes and other persons to ensure compliance.197 By adopting their 
own standards, national legislatures can help athletes within their respec-
tive jurisdictions understand the anti-doping policy and establish a de-
finitive banned substances list that will be standardized for all national 
sports federations, as long as it is more inclusive than the WADA banned 
substances list. 
Another difficulty for WADA is that its provisions are enforced and 
upheld by a specialized administrative tribunal, the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (“CAS”).198 Even though CAS is an internationally accepted 
arbitration court that currently holds exclusive jurisdiction over anti-
doping violations in international sports, the CAS is only binding upon 
member states,199 and, without clear precedent, and, given the potential 
for conflicting national legislation, there will be no explanatory guide-
posts for athletes to follow.200 CAS jurisdiction does not extend to pro-
fessional sports organizations or national sports federations as these 
groups are not signatories to WADA, so the absence of a localized anti-
doping regulation or the creation of a regime that does not adequately 
mirror the WADA Code may result in incongruous sanctions for the 
same violation. Similarly, WADA and the Anti-Doping Convention have 
different definitions for terms, including the definition of “athlete,”201 
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and, therefore, even when CAS has exclusive jurisdiction, the same  
evidence may be evaluated on a different standard, which may dictate the 
guilt or innocence of the athlete differently.202 
Another problem with WADA is that some countries may find the 
sanctions inappropriate or ineffective.203 For medical support personnel 
or physicians who are found guilty of an anti-doping violation, a two-
year suspension from the sport may not be a sufficient deterrence from 
engaging in illicit behavior.204 These individuals can easily shift to 
another sport, or work privately with teams or athletes that are not  
governed by international agreements. Some countries may find that a 
substantial fine or other sanction is more appropriate. Alternatively, the 
two-year ban for athletes will interrupt their careers and prevent them 
from engaging in their occupations,205 possibly in violation of national 
labor laws prohibiting restraint on trade.206 A fine would carry a minimal 
element of deterrence considering the magnitude of salaries of pro-
fessional athletes.207 
Recent studies have indicated that athletes who still want to cheat even 
in the face of the comprehensive WADA code can do so with little risk 
of being caught.208 A study conducted by the Copenhagen Muscle  
Research Center in Denmark—designed to test the efficacy of the 
WADA testing facilities—found that WADA accredited laboratories 
were unable to successfully test for the presence of erythropoietin 
(“EPO”), a substance that stimulates the production of oxygen-carrying 
red blood cells that helps improve an athlete’s endurance.209 Researchers 
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believe that it is very hard to establish the presence of illegal hormones 
in urine analysis because the body naturally produces hormones such as 
EPO and testosterone, which are banned substances only when produced 
artificially, pursuant to WADA.210 
Athletes will not be effectively deterred by WADA when they believe 
they can avoid a positive test.211 A glaring example is the recent drug 
scandals that have plagued the Tour de France.212 The 2007 winner  
Alberto Contrador did not participate in the 2008 race because his team 
was excluded, having been involved in various doping scandals over the 
past two years.213 American Floyd Landis lost his 2006 title after he 
failed a drug test.214 This year, Spanish cyclists Moisès Dueñas Nevado 
and Manuel Beltrán each tested positive for EPO during the Tour de 
France,215 and Italian rider Riccardo Ricco also tested positive, after 
which his entire team voluntarily withdrew from the race.216 In each  
instance, the riders allegedly took PEDs fully aware they would be tested 
consistently throughout the race—the rules stipulated that the winning 
rider of each stage, the overall leader, and randomly selected riders 
would be tested each day.217 Such results cast doubt upon the validity of 
previous titles won by the disqualified athletes and also call into question 
how many other riders were using EPO without being tested and caught. 
                                                                                                             
to WADA accredited laboratories, one lab found some positive and others “suspicious.” 
Another lab did not find any samples positive, and found others suspicious. Id. The two 
labs did not agree on which samples were suspicious. Under the Code, if one lab finds a 
sample suspicious, or even finds it positive for and illegal substance such as EPO, the 
sample must be tested again by a different laboratory, and the athlete is only found guilty 
of an anti-doping violation if the second lab detects the illegal substance. Id. Under 
WADA rules, none of the eight subjects in the study would have been found guilty of a 
doping violation, even though all eight men had elevated red blood cell counts and im-
proved endurance performances. Id. 
 210. Kolata, supra note 208. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Edward Wyatt, Embarking on Tour Of Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2008, at 
D6. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Edward Wyatt, Second Rider is Expelled for a Positive Drug Test, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2008, at D2. 
 216. Edward Wyatt, More Turmoil at Tour After 3rd Positive Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 
18, 2008, at D1. 
 217. Jerome Pugmire, Agencies vie to control anti-doping program, Oct. 23, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/cycling/2008-10-23-536248034_x.htm. 
298 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
Even when the quantity of positive tests is decreasing, it is naïve to  
believe that athletes are not cheating.218 Adding a single grain of pow-
dered laundry detergent to a urine sample will destroy EPO and human 
growth hormone in the urine.219 When the threat of a two-year suspen-
sion is not enough to deter an athlete who has knowingly used PEDs 
from walking into a drug test because that athlete is confident that he or 
she can beat the test anyway, a new regime must be implemented. The 
international regime has only forced athletes, medical personnel, and 
scientists to work harder to beat the drug tests, but individual countries 
must take it upon themselves to institute a policy that will force dopers 
out and restore the integrity of sports. 
2. Legislation 
In an effort to close the loopholes in the WADA regime, and also to 
more effectively investigate and eradicate doping violations, European 
countries have instituted national legislative schemes that build upon the 
WADA foundation. Due in large part to the doping scandals that have 
plagued some of Europe’s most prestigious athletic competitions such as 
the Tour de France, national governments have taken action to expose 
and eliminate the use of illegal PEDs because “drug use in sports threat-
ens . . . the credibility of heroes, their accomplishments, and the integrity 
of the games they participate in.”220 As in the United States, PEDs are 
becoming more prevalent in European “high school locker rooms and on 
neighborhood soccer fields.”221 PEDs’ negative effects can be most 
harmful when they not only affect the physical health of young people 
who use them, but also encourage children to cheat and thus corrupt the 
positive impact sports would otherwise have on the their psychological 
development.222 
In 2000, the Italian government adopted one of the first national anti-
doping statutes aimed at combating the use of PEDs by regulating the 
health standards in athletic activities.223 The legislation states that be-
cause the aim of sport is to promote individual and collective health, 
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sporting activities are to be governed by ethical principles and education-
al values that are integral to Italian society.224 As doping is a matter of 
national health, the Minister of Health is to create, under the law, a 
commission composed of experts from the entire spectrum of society, 
including physicians, political representatives, biochemists, athletes, and 
coaches225 to help develop a list of banned substances,226 testing proto-
cols,227 and to determine appropriate sanctions for violations.228 
Significantly, the law vigorously targets individuals who “obtain,  
administer or use drugs not justified by pathological conditions that may 
alter the performance of athletes” by imposing criminal penalties of  
potential fines and imprisonment up to three years.229 Similar penalties 
are imposed for substances that may, or are intended, to modify the  
results of a drug test.230 This law is applicable not only to Italian athletes 
engaging in international competition, but also to all Italian citizens,  
including professional soccer leagues (which are populated by some of 
the most talented and most popular athletes in the world).231 Italian  
athletes would have to heavily consider the allure of PEDs and weigh the 
benefits of use against the costs of a potential criminal conviction and jail 
time should they test positive. Even for the greatest superstars, such  
international embarrassment would likely end their professional athletic 
careers and assuredly terminate any endorsement contracts they  
possessed. Even if athletes believe they can beat the drug test, the risk of 
heavy fines or imprisonment would surely serve as a greater deterrent 
than a comparatively petty two-year suspension. 
In France, the legislature adopted a comprehensive anti-doping pro-
gram, creating the French Anti-Doping Agency (“AFLD”), an indepen-
dent public legal authority designed to determine and implement anti-
doping measures pursuant to French legislation adopted in October 
2006.232 The law makes AFLD responsible for establishing doping con-
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trols,233 drafting a list of prohibited substances,234 and developing preven-
tion, education, and research activities related to anti-doping.235 It also 
gives the AFLD the power to overrule sanctions imposed by national 
sports federations if the AFLD committee deems a sanction too  
lenient.236 Under this regime, the French government allows the individ-
ual sports federations to police themselves, while still employing inde-
pendent oversight to ensure that sanctions properly correspond to the 
seriousness of the crime. French law also employs the criminal justice 
system to punish individuals who supply athletes or minors with illegal 
performance-enhancing substances.237 
The law punishes those who facilitate or encourage the use of PEDs 
“in any way” with five years imprisonment and a fine of €75,000 Eu-
ros.238 This hard-line stance shows the nation’s citizens that their gov-
ernment is committed to preserving the health of all sportsmen, both pro-
fessional and amateur, and that rather than punish the athlete, the law 
targets the supplier. Imposing such heavy sanctions upon the source sug-
gests a legislative intent to substantially decrease the availability of PEDs 
within the country, as physicians and drug suppliers will not risk debili-
tating fines and lengthy jail sentences when they are only intermediary 
financial beneficiaries of PED use, compared to the athletes who receive 
fame, glory, and robust endorsement deals. 
In 2008, Germany also introduced its own version of an anti-doping 
law,239 as the legislature felt compelled to act to protect “society’s 
health” upon the recognition that doping “tends to destroy ethical-moral 
values of the sports world.”240 The legislature based this decision on  
statistics that found that “sixty-six percent of all adults living in Germany 
participate regularly in sporting activities and see professional athletes as 
their heroes.”241 The German government believed that the current inter-
national doping framework was ineffective, that the individual sports 
federations were unable to adequately regulate doping in sports, and that 
                                                                                                             
 233. CODE DU SPORT [C. SPORT] art. L. 232-5(). 
 234. The banned substances list mirrors the WADA banned substances list and shall be 
published in the Official Journal of the French Republic. C. SPORT art. L. 232–9(). 
 235. C. SPORT art. L. 232-5. 
 236. C. SPORT art. L. 232-21, 22, 23. 
 237. C. SPORT art. L. 232-26. 
 238. Id. 
 239. BTDrucks 16/5526, available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/055/160 
5526.pdf. 
 240. Julia Völlmecke, Doping As a Crime? The Policy Issue Concerning the Choice of 
Method to Deal with Doping, INT’L SPORTS L.J., 2008/1-2, at 49, 49. 
 241. Id. 
2010] SAFE AT HOME? 301 
criminal law was necessary to protect individual athletes as well as socie-
ty from harm.242 
3. The Criminalization Rationale 
A state-enforced code of conduct supported by the criminal justice  
system is an appropriate method to avoid the serious threats posed by 
illegal PEDs to society’s welfare, integrity, and health.243 Methods used 
for cheating in sports continue to develop at an extraordinary rate, and, as 
such, the government is in a better position to develop and enforce a code 
of conduct, as opposed to a private organization whose interests may not 
necessarily be aligned with the public’s.244 Since doping in sports is a 
public concern, the enforcement of morality-based laws with criminal 
penalties is valid in that it provides the “certainty, consistency[,] and 
transparency” that is missing from the private and international reg-
ulatory framework.245 “The aim of criminal law is to protect the individ-
ual as well as society from harm,”246 and this is a necessary step, not only 
to police the ball fields, but also to ensure the prominent position of 
sports in society and to combat a potentially life-threatening influence on 
young athletes. The promotion of health in society is not met solely by 
deterring the use of PEDs—a comprehensive regime that can investigate, 
detect, and prevent potential use of physically harmful substances is  
necessary.247 
Using the criminal justice system to combat doping violations goes far 
beyond what is employed by the governing international doctrine. The 
criminal justice system would offer new ways to conduct criminal inves-
tigations into allegations of possession, use, and development of PEDs, 
as well as provide law enforcement with the necessary tools to order in-
vestigatory searches and seizures of incriminating evidence.248 An athlete 
facing criminal charges might be more likely to cooperate with authori-
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ties when faced with imprisonment.249 Even the threat of costly legal 
proceedings could be sufficiently intimidating to persuade an athlete to 
cooperate250 in investigations, which could lead to more convictions of 
those who are most deeply involved in PED production or distribution 
schemes. 
Certainly, criminalization of doping violations would impose new ob-
ligations and responsibilities on the state.251 The state would be charged 
with preserving the individual autonomy of the athlete while still acting 
in the name of the public interest.252 Although the criminalization of dop-
ing violations, which would ultimately require the use of evidence  
collected via mandatory drug-tests in criminal proceedings, may evoke 
Constitutional challenges in light of the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition 
on forced self-incrimination, such use of real evidence in a criminal  
proceeding will likely pass muster under the standard set forth in 
Schmerber v. California.253 On the other hand, State constitutional provi-
sions often provide greater protection to the accused,254 and, therefore, 
additional Constitutional issues may arise depending on jurisdiction, 
which further complicates essential doping-control uniformity. Participa-
tion in sports, however, necessarily requires acceptance of the governing 
rules,255 and it is of paramount importance that the public confidence in 
the integrity of athletic competitions be restored by ensuring the continu-
ing “adherence to the essential values of fairness, justice[,] and equal-
ity”256 that form the cornerstones of competitive sport. The European 
Convention on Human Rights provides for the qualified right of respect 
for privacy, but allows for special exceptions when interference is  
“necessary in a democratic society . . . for protection of health or mor-
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. .”); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 255. Ioannidis, supra note 246, at 31. 
 256. Id. 
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als.”257 Under this document, preserving individual privacy may be out-
weighed by the justification for criminalizing the harms and risks that 
threaten “society’s welfare, integrity[,] and existence.”258 If the national 
legislature determines societal concerns demand the criminalization of 
doping violations, athletes who participate do so via free will with full 
knowledge of the consequences of their choices. 
Additionally, as sports law expert Gregory Ioannidis notes, sports are 
inextricably linked with society259 and serve to promote values that society 
honors and desires to protect,260 thus, the criminalization of doping viola-
tions is an important step forward in working to preserve the safe and 
healthy development of the nation’s youth.261 In addition to honesty and 
fairness, sports promote healthy development by encouraging young ath-
letes to stay active and to get much-needed exercise,262 all while helping 
to develop a sense of community and camaraderie fostered by teamwork. 
It is argued that morality should not influence the law,263 but the crimina-
lization of PEDs is only a small step beyond current law in the United 
States, which punishes the use and possession of substances with limited 
or unknown health benefits under the Controlled Substances Act.264 
The legal framework is already in place for the United States to follow 
its international counterparts in adopting a more dynamic approach to 
counter the unprincipled “pursuit of wealth and fame [that] now threat-
en[s] our very social fabric.”265 The criminal code has already been  
employed to preserve and protect the health of society; why not adopt 
legislation in the United States that also safeguards the public interest266 
in sport, which encompasses education, professionalism, and ideals of 
fairness, justice, and equality? 
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III. THE INDECISIVE STATES OF AMERICA 
Although the United States Olympic Association is bound by the 
WADA Code267 and testing is carried out by the United States Anti-
Doping Agency (“USADA”),268 American professional sports remain 
outside WADA jurisdiction.269 The decision to remain outside the reach 
of WADA falls squarely on the individual sports leagues, and the inabili-
ty to agree upon a standardized testing regime is due in part to the fact 
that professional sports are governed by the National Labor Relations 
Act (“NLRA”),270 which severely restricts the ability of the league to 
unilaterally impose any conditions upon its participants.271 Sports organi-
zations with a collective bargaining relationship must bargain in good 
faith for “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.”272 
Drug testing is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.273 For 
players who want to use PEDs, or others who feel the testing regime  
imposed by WADA is too restrictive,274 the collective preference of the 
various Players’ Unions in professional sports has been to take a strong 
stance against the adoption of the WADA Code. Why would an athlete 
want to subject himself to out-of-season testing, having to report his 
whereabouts to league officials any time he leaves the state or risk losing 
his multi-million dollar endorsement deal if he were to test positive for a 
PED because he took an over the counter common cold medicine that 
contained a banned substance? 
Although athletes who have already made it to the professional leagues 
may not consider the integrity of the sport in jeopardy, the use of PEDs 
in sports poisons American youths’ conceptions of fairness, honesty, and, 
most importantly, health. Seeking to address these important issues of 
                                                                                                             
 267. See sources cited supra note 83. 
 268. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 220, at 475. 
 269. Id. at 476. 
 270. 29 U.S.C. §§151–169 (2006); WALTER T. CHAMPION, SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
41 (2d ed. 2000). 
 271. Showalter, supra note 39, at 655. 
 272. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). 
 273. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1989) (finding that drug and alco-
hol testing is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining because it is “germane to the 
working environment, and, outside the scope of managerial decisions,” which are two 
criteria the Supreme Court had established for mandatory subject matters). 
 274. “In order for authorities to conduct random testing, [athletes] must keep [authori-
ties] informed of . . . [their whereabouts] . . . 365 days a year . . . .” Rosen, supra note 
160, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Athletes would be eligible to be tested at any 
hour of any day, without any prior notice, regardless of whether or not their sport is in 
season. Id. 
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public interest, Congressional leaders have proposed legislation to  
require professional sports leagues to come into accordance with WADA 
testing protocols to be governed by the USADA,275 and for doping  
violations to be sanctioned based upon the WADA guidelines,276 yet no 
legislative action has been taken. 
Although the rationale behind the proposed legislation277 mirrors the 
intent of many European legislatures that have successfully adopted  
national anti-doping laws, such legislation faces heavier resistance in the 
United States due to privacy issues and Fourth Amendment concerns of 
unreasonable searches and seizures.278 Under the proposed legislation, 
“through the [Controlled Substances Act], the federal government would 
compel certain private parties—the various professional sports leagues—
to drug test their employees.”279 Under current constitutional law, the 
only way the federal government could require private drug testing 
would be on the basis of a special needs exception that could only be 
justified after a careful balancing of both public and private interests.280 
Proposed mandatory drug testing will not be constitutional if the gov-
ernment cannot show a special need beyond normal crime control.281 In 
order to support the argument that drug testing of professional athletes 
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can evade traditional Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause 
requirements,282 the three elements of a “special need” must be met: (1) 
the drug use must be an actual threat; (2) the drug testing must be aimed 
at actually detecting drug use, not simply deterring it; and (3) there must 
be a genuine threat to public safety.283 Without a special need, warrant-
less and suspicionless drug testing is a clear violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.284 
While this might at first seem discouraging for proponents of federally 
mandated drug testing policies in professional sports, supporters identify 
a 1995 Supreme Court opinion as providing sufficient grounds to estab-
lish drug testing as a “special need” necessary to protect public safety.285 
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court held that the signifi-
cant governmental interest in protecting the public safety—especially the 
safety of children—was sufficient to outweigh the student athletes’ pri-
vacy interests.286 The Court stated that in an effort to curb teenage use of 
PEDs, random drug testing of student athletes by the school district was 
constitutionally permissible because drug use had reached uncontrollable 
levels and participation in athletics was a voluntary decision, to be made 
with full knowledge of drug-testing procedures.287 The constitutionality 
of special needs are assessed under a reasonableness standard,288 and 
surely it would be reasonable to extend Vernonia to permit federally 
mandated drug testing of professional athletes as a matter of public 
health and safety based on the statistical correlation between use of PEDs 
by athletes and use by teenagers. 
Another argument asserted by professional sports organizations against 
the imposition of sanctions upon athletes is that the sports leagues are in 
a better position to regulate the conduct of participants, and, historically, 
Congress has declined to regulate internal governance of professional 
sports and the collective bargaining process.289 The leagues argue that 
they are the primary victims of banned PED use because the principle 
resulting injury sustained is the shame that players who have been caught 
                                                                                                             
 282. Showalter, supra note 39, at 671. 
 283. Joy L. Ames, Note, Chandler v. Miller: Redefining Special Needs for Suspicion-
less Drug Testing Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 AKRON L. REV. 273, 291–94 (1997). 
 284. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318–22 (holding that requiring state government candidates 
to undergo drug testing before running for office violated the Fourth Amendment because 
using testing to set a good example was not a special need that outweighed the candi-
date’s privacy interests). 
 285. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
 289. See Mitten, supra note 20. 
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cheating bring to the league, resulting in the damaged faith and integrity 
of once-glorified historical records.290 However, this argument is short-
sighted, as it seeks to prevent the government from entering a new reg-
ulatory field when legitimate public interest so requires. Health and  
safety of all citizens is of paramount concern for a government, be it the 
well-being of children or professional athletes. 
IV. RISE OF THE MUTANT-ATHLETE? 
The deterrence power of civil sanctions is only as effective as the test-
ing policies and the efforts to remain ahead of PED developers. PEDs 
undetectable by any drug test may soon be (or already have been)291  
developed. “Gene therapy involves injecting synthetic [genetic material] 
into muscle cells, where they become indistinguishable from the receiv-
er’s DNA.”292 As gene therapy can speed up metabolic processes in the 
body thereby increasing endurance as well as muscle mass, athletes may 
turn to this innovative field of science to improve performance while 
avoiding detection.293 Early lab tests on mice suggest that successful  
genetic engineering has the potential to double athletic output with no 
identified side effects.294 On the other hand, a clinical trial using gene 
therapy in French teenagers to treat defective immune systems had less 
promising, lethal results.295 
Although gene therapy is highly experimental and the potential long-
term biological effects are largely unknown,296 current use of PEDs sug-
gests a willingness among athletes to risk the medical uncertainties for 
the sake of short-term success.297 With multi-million dollar contracts and 
even more lucrative endorsement deals at stake, the cost of genetic dop-
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ing would hardly serve as a barrier to elite athletes, and amateur athletes 
might even consider the cost an investment in their athletic career. If  
genetic doping becomes a real possibility—assuming it has not already—
the integrity of pure athletic competition will be lost for good, as athletes 
will be juiced with PEDs that cannot be detected by urinalysis or even 
blood tests.298 
If performance enhancement reaches this level, athletic competition 
will be dominated by a super-race of genetic mutants, biochemically  
engineered to run faster, jump higher, and out-muscle the competition. 
As new world records are set and the history books are rewritten, it will 
become harder to prevent young athletes from experimenting with either 
genetic doping or some cheaper, more easily available alternative that 
carries equal or greater health risks. Furthermore, countries that cannot 
regulate the doping epidemic may be banned from international competi-
tion, resulting in utter embarrassment not only to the government that 
was unable to regulate PEDs, but also to the ordinary citizens who no 
longer have the ability to compete in the games they love or even support 
their compatriots against the world’s greatest natural athletes. Indeed, the 
cheaters will have won the race to the finish line. 
CONCLUSION 
If anti-doping violations are not criminalized, we cannot adequately  
attack the source of the problem. Current sanctions only punish the PED 
user, while those who develop and distribute PEDs are free to continue to 
adulterate the integrity of professional sports, certain to find another ath-
lete who will stop at nothing to achieve his or her dream of being the 
champion. The goal of criminalizing PEDs is not only intended to punish 
those who are willing to violate the integrity of the game, but also to  
uncover the culture of fraud that has thus far remained a step (or three?) 
ahead of efforts to detect and deter PED use. 
Unless Congress takes action to further a more comprehensive, effective 
policy to investigate and tackle the use of PEDs, doping will remain an 
integral characteristic of American sports, not only tainting the history 
books but also intensifying the perception of American athletes as chea-
ters. Legendary former NFL coach Vince Lombardi’s use of the famous 
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quote, “Winning isn’t everything, it’s the only thing”299 perfectly epito-
mizes the current nature of professional sports: to be the best at the high-
est levels of competition, athletes, teams, coaches, and even medical staff 
will do anything and everything to attain victory. 
Current drug testing protocols and league-mandated sanctions are not 
an effective deterrence mechanism in the fight against PEDs. The Con-
gressional effort to detect and test for new substances must equal or out-
shine the rapid development of designer steroids and masking agents 
conceived by dirty chemists, or society will be forced to trust the safe-
guarding of athletic integrity to the conscience of professional athletes. 
As more gold medals are revoked for anti-doping violations and more 
elite athletes are unmasked as current or former PED abusers, the time 
has come for Congress to recognize that dependence on professional ath-
letes to self-regulate the integrity of sport is no longer feasible. 
The longer Congress waits to act, the greater the chance young athletes 
will be influenced by athletes who set world records and achieve instant 
fame but who are later discovered to have fraudulently achieved their 
success through illicit performance enhancement. By imposing criminal 
punishments on par with those linked to the Controlled Substance Act for 
cocaine, heroin, or psychoactive drugs such as ecstasy, Congress can 
help save the lives of children and professional athletes alike who might 
otherwise succumb to the serious health problems believed to be asso-
ciated with PEDs. The United States must follow the lead of its interna-
tional counterparts and grant crime prevention authorities the tools  
necessary to investigate and deter and punish PED production and distri-
bution—the heart of the PED crisis—rather than trust that tough talk, 
empty threats, and blind faith will save the health of our athletes and 
children and preserve the integrity of our sports. If we can put the teeth 
of the criminal justice system behind our desire to clean up the game, we 
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America can still prevent the creation of a genetically modified class of 
athletes and avoid international embarrassment, all in the name of pre-
serving our most cherished values of health, fairness, honesty, and pure 
athletic competition. 
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